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ABSTRACT 
Owing to dissatisfaction with the IMF’s de jure classification of exchange-rate 
regimes, a substantial literature has emerged presenting de facto classifications of 
exchange-rate systems and using the latter classifications to compare performances of 
alternative regimes in terms of key macroeconomic variables. This paper critically 
reviews the literature on de facto regimes. In particular the paper (1) describes the 
main methodologies that have been used to construct de facto codings, (2) surveys the 
empirical literature generated by de facto regime codings, and (3) lays-out the 
problems inherent in constructing de facto classifications. The empirical literature is 
found to yield few robust findings. We argue that the as-yet unfulfilled objective of 
this literature, and the major research agenda for the future in this area, lies in the 
need of a more thorough investigation of the degree of monetary-policy independence 
without relying exclusively on movements in exchange rates, an agenda the 
attainment of which is made especially challenging because of the lack of 
comprehensive and reliable data on reserves and interest rates. 
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The classification and assessment of the performance of exchange-rate 
regimes have been a central focus of recent research in international economics. A 
substantial empirical literature has emerged presenting alternative codings of 
exchange-rate systems and comparing the performance of these systems in terms of 
key macroeconomic variables, including economic growth, inflation, and output 
variability. Such has been the extent to which the use of these codings has permeated 
the literature that Genberg and Swoboda (2004, p. 5) commented that “the 
classifications have rapidly become the new standard in research on exchange-rate 
regimes”. The purpose of this essay is to set-out what we know about the 
consequences of the choice of the exchange-rate regime and to critically review the 
proliferating literature on the classification and the performance of alternative 
regimes.  
  The recent interest in assessing the functioning of exchange-rate systems 
stems from several factors. First, it is a natural outgrowth of the long-standing debate 
about the merits of floating versus fixed exchange rates.
 1 The more than thirty-years’ 
experience with managed floating and other currency arrangements following the 
demise of the Bretton-Woods system of pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates has 
provided ample data with which to compare the performance of fixed-rate systems 
with the varieties of more-flexible regimes that have sprung up in the post-Bretton-
Woods era. Second, for many years empirical work on exchange-rate regimes relied 
on the de jure coding reported by the IMF, which classified regimes according to what 
the authorities said they did.
2 However, in an influential article, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) found that, in practice, many exchange-rate regimes did not function according 
to the de jure rules, so that empirical analyses of the relationship between economic 
performance and regime choice based on the de jure classification risked yielding 
results that led to misleading statistical inferences (Edwards and Savastano, 1999; 
Rogoff et al., 2004). In the light of these problems, a main area of recent research has 
involved the construction of alternative, de facto, regime classifications, which 
attempt more accurately to capture the authorities’ practices. Third, the fact that the 
                                                 
1 Frankel (2003, p. 13) commented that “the choice of currency regime … is perhaps the most widely 
studied topic in international economics”.  
2 The de jure codings were published until 1999 by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange-Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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 exchange-rate crises during the 1990s were concentrated heavily among intermediate 
regimes - - or soft pegs - - led to what has become known as “the hypothesis of the 
vanishing-middle regime” (Frankel, 2003). According to this bipolar hypothesis, for 
countries well-integrated into world capital markets, intermediate regimes are crisis-
prone so that there is little, if any, feasible middle ground between floating exchange 
rates and monetary unification (Eichengreen, 1994; Fischer, 2001). Consequently, a 
main thrust of recent research has been to compare the performance of intermediate 
regimes with those of the corner options of floating and hard pegs and to assess 
whether a retreat from the middle ground has, in fact, occurred. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. To set the stage, Section 2 
describes alternative exchange-rate systems. Section 3 describes the coding 
approaches that have been put forward in the recent literature and assesses the 
alternative codings in terms of their reliability. Section 4 begins with a brief 
discussion of some analytic aspects of exchange-rate systems and considers the earlier 
empirical literature dealing with macro-economic performance under different 
regimes. It then takes stock of the recent empirical results that have been derived from 
the various coding approaches. We focus on the empirical results pertaining to real 
per-capita growth, inflation, and output volatility across regimes and the evolution of 
regimes over time. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of problems that remain to 
be addressed and the research tasks ahead for devisers and users of coding schemes.  
 
2.  Types of regimes: a primer 
There is a continuum of exchange-rate regimes that runs from free floating to 
hard fixes (Frankel, 1999). The following taxonomy begins with flexible 
arrangements and progresses to increasingly-rigid regimes.
3
(i) Free Floating. Under free-floating rates there is no commitment to a 
specific exchange-rate target. Supply and demand in the market determine the 
exchange rate. The authorities do not intervene in the foreign-exchange market and do 
not set interest rates for the purpose of “affecting the level or path of the exchange 
rate” (Kenen, 2001, p. 75).  
                                                 
3 See Corden (2002), Goldstein (2002), and Tavlas and Ulan (2002, and the articles contained therein) 
for detailed discussions of exchange-rate regimes. 
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 (ii) Managed Floating. In this regime, although there is no specific exchange-
rate target, the authorities may intervene in the foreign-exchange market and/or set 
interest rates to influence the exchange rate. The authorities’ objective may be to 
smooth short-term (monthly, weekly, or even hourly) volatility if there is a concern 
that, in thin foreign-exchange markets, excessive volatility may lead to disorderly and 
illiquid markets, a situation often characterized by wide bid-ask spreads and sudden 
jumps in prices (i.e., successive transaction prices outside the previous bid-ask spread) 
(Ho and McCauley, 2003, pp. 18-19). The authorities may also aim to reverse long-
term “misalignment”, defined as a sustained departure of the exchange rate from the 
authorities’ perception of its equilibrium value.  
(iii) Soft Pegs. Pegged-exchange-rate regimes can be unilateral or part of a 
systems’ arrangement (as under the euro area’s exchange rate mechanism, or ERM 
II). The peg can be against a single currency or against a basket of currencies.
4 All 
pegged-exchange-rate commitments entail contingencies under which the exchange-
rate target may be altered (Eichengreen, 1994, pp. 21-22). Under an adjustable peg, 
the authorities target a particular value of the exchange rate. The bands tend to be 
narrow (less than or equal to ±2.25 per cent), and the target rate is adjusted if the 
authorities perceive a discrepancy to arise between the target exchange rate and the 
equilibrium rate. The target rate tends to be adjusted infrequently and by large 
amounts (Kenen, 2001, p. 75). Typically, the central bank’s foreign-currency reserves 
do not cover all domestic monetary liabilities, allowing the use of monetary-policy 
instruments to some degree to smooth swings in domestic interest rates and/or to 
support domestic financial institutions on a temporary basis (Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf, 
2000, p. 277). Under a crawling peg (or crawling band), the authorities target a preset 
path for the exchange rate instead of a level. The bands tend to be somewhat wider 
than the bands around the adjustable pegs because they must accommodate crawling 
of the pegs. The target rate is altered frequently and by relatively small amounts 
(Kenen, 2001).
5  
                                                 
4 The weights of the currencies in the basket often reflect an economy’s geographical distribution of 
trade and/or capital flows. 
5 Mussa et al. (2000, p. 26) pointed-out that “the distinction between a [crawling] band and a peg is 
somewhat arbitrary, but a peg is often understood as a band in which the margins on either side of the 
central parity are less than or equal to 2.25 per cent”. Crawling bands are also referred to as target 
zones (Williamson, 1996 p. 2). 
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  (iv) Currency boards. A currency board issues notes and coins convertible on 
demand under all circumstances, at a fixed rate of exchange, against a foreign anchor 
currency (Humpage and McIntire, 1995, p. 2).
 It guarantees this commitment by fully 
backing the domestic monetary base - - but not the domestic money supply - - with 
the foreign anchor currency and by setting the exchange rate as a matter of public law.  
(v)  Dollarisation  (or  Euroisation). Under dollarisation, a country officially 
adopts a foreign currency as its legal tender. Unlike the situation pertaining under a 
currency-board arrangement, the local currency is completely replaced by the foreign 
currency adopted, rather than limited in quantity by the number of units of anchor 
currency held by the currency board. 
(vi)  Monetary Union. This arrangement involves the adoption of a single 
currency and a common central bank by a group of economies. Monetary unification 
implies that responsibility for exchange-rate policy and for the balance of payments of 
the entire community with the rest of the world must be assigned to the community. 
The monetary authority of the community controls the pool of foreign-exchange 
reserves (Robson, 1998).     
In the following sections, currency boards, dollarisation, and monetary unions 
are considered “hard pegs”. The distinction between hard pegs and soft pegs is that, 
under the former, the policy to fix the exchange rate (or adopt a common currency) is 
an institutional commitment (e.g., a law mandating a currency board that requires a 
legislative supermajority to reverse it), whereas, under the latter, the policy to peg is a 
conditional promise (Frankel, 2003; Bordo, 2004). The difference between soft pegs 
and floating (freely floating and managed floating) is that, under the former, there is a 
target zone (or band) near the boundaries of which the authorities are normally 
expected to intervene whereas, under the latter, there is neither an explicit nor an 
implicit target zone (Bordo, 2004). 
The key distinctive characteristic of a regime is the extent to which it 
constrains domestic monetary policy. Under free floating, the exchange rate does not 
constrain monetary policy, whereas, under a soft peg, the authorities adopt a particular 
exchange-rate target and use monetary policy to prevent the foreign-exchange 
market’s straying too far from the target. Operational meaning is given to the phrase 
“too far” by the announcement of a target rate and the width of a band around it 
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 (Kenen, 2001, p. 75). By design, currency boards have no discretionary monetary 
powers and cannot extend credit. The quantity of domestic currency in circulation is 
determined solely by market forces (Hanke, 2002, p. 88). In the case of monetary 
unions, the use of the standard instruments of monetary policy is consigned to the 
community and exercised solely by its monetary authority, leaving no room for the 
exercise of monetary policy by the individual member economies (Robson, 1998). 
 
3. Alternative classifications 
3.1. Classification approaches 
Ideally, an exchange rate system classification ought to be based on the degree 
to which a system in a particular category constraints the independent conduct of 
domestic monetary policy. Unfortunately, this goal has so far proved elusive. The de 
jure classification, compiled and published until 1999 by the IMF, distinguished 
among three broad exchange-rate-regime categories - - pegged regimes (hard pegs, 
conventional pegs, horizontal bands), intermediate regimes (crawling pegs, crawling 
bands, target zones), and floating arrangements (free floats, managed floats).
6 Several 
advantages were attributed to the de jure classification. It was considered to be 
comprehensive in terms of (i) the coverage of economies, (ii) observations over time 
(extending back to 1970), and (iii) frequency of updating (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 
2002). Additionally, to the extent that intentions could be viewed as a good indicator 
of future actions, it was said to convey information about future policy actions, 
thereby influencing expectations and outcomes (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002 p. 42). 
  As noted, however, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that, in practice, many 
exchange-rate regimes deviated substantially from their de jure codings.
7 For 
example, the currencies of some economies, the regimes of which were officially 
reported as pegs, often underwent frequent devaluations as the exchange rate was used 
as a tool to try to maintain or to enhance competitiveness; thus, the regime resembled 
a flexible one more than a pegged one. Conversely, the currencies of other economies, 
the regimes of which were officially classified as flexible under the de jure 
                                                 
6 Based on footnotes provided in the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, these 
three classifications could, in turn, be divided into as many as 15 subcategories. 
7 See, also, Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf (1997) and Frankel (1999) for earlier formulations of this 
view. 
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 classification, exhibited what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) called a “fear of floating”, 
relying on interest-rate adjustments and changes in reserves to limit movements in the 
exchange rate.  
  De facto regime classifications attempt to rectify the deficiencies of the de jure 
coding. The primary aim of these undertakings has been to compare the performance 
of regimes and to shed light on the validity of the hypothesis of the vanishing-middle 
regime. Studies in this genre tend to share several common features. (1) Regimes are 
arranged according to both coarse (e.g., three, five) and fine (e.g., 15) categories. (2) 
Performance under alternative regimes is measured using both unconditional means 
(and/or medians) and conditional means (based on multiple-regression estimation). (3) 
Results are reported for the aggregate of all economies considered and for subgroups 
of economies (i.e., industrial, emerging markets, developing). As discussed below, to 
classify regimes a number of judgmental decisions need to be taken (e.g., the choice 
of reference currency against which the degree of exchange-rate flexibility is 
assessed, whether to incorporate changes in reserves and/or interest rates in the 
classification algorithm). Studies differ in terms of the methodologies used to classify 
regimes, with most studies relying (to differing extents) on the IMF de jure 
classification, so that the resulting coding is, in fact, a mixed de jure-de facto 
classification. Studies also differ in terms of sample periods, data frequency, 
definitions of regimes (for both coarse and fine categories), definitions of 
subcategories used to analyse economies (e.g., industrial, advanced), and conditioning 
variables, so that the results are not strictly comparable. Interpretation is made more 
difficult because some authors report large numbers of regressions, differentiated by, 
among other things, the choice of conditioning variables, with sometimes conflicting 
results both across regressions and studies.  
In what follows, the construction of thirteen mixed and pure de facto 
categories is considered, and the main thrust of the empirical results is presented and 
analyzed. To help identify the main dividing lines running through the literature, the 
classification schemes are grouped into two broad methodological approaches: (1) 
mixed de jure-de facto codings based on revisions to, and/or corrections of, the IMF 
de jure classification (eight schemes); and (2) pure de facto codings (five schemes). 
Although the schemes in the first category rely on the IMF de jure coding, they do so 
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 in different ways, and there is a wide range of differences across the codings. The 
codings in the second category are independent of the de jure coding. 
 1.  Mixed de jure-de facto approaches. The codings in this group can be 
viewed as “mixed” classifications because the self-declared regimes are adjusted by 
the divisers for anomalies (e.g., floating rates that display no exchange-rate volatility) 
on the basis of such factors as judgment, statistical algorithms, and developments in 
parallel (black) markets. An initial attempt to construct a de facto classification was 
made by Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (GGOW). Employing the sample period 
1960-90 
8 for 136 countries, these authors (1997) rearranged the de jure pegged 
grouping into two (de facto) subgroups - - “infrequent” and “frequent” pegged 
adjusters - - based on whether an economy changed the value of the declared peg 
within a particular year. They placed de jure intermediate and floating regimes in a 
single (de jure) group. Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2001) also modified the de jure 
coding, doing so for a group of 26 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Using 
information provided in the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, they reclassified regimes into four course groupings that distinguished 
among regimes in terms of their abilities to provide credibility and competitiveness.
9
  In studies by the IMF (1999; 2003) and Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002), 190 
self-described (by the national authorities) regimes, covering the (monthly) period 
1990-2001, were amended by IMF economists based on their assessments of 
movements in reserves and official exchange rates or, in cases where there are 
multiple rates, secondary-market exchange rates. To illustrate the judgment involved, 
when the de jure regime was a peg, but the currency underwent frequent devaluations 
within “very short periods of time” (within several months), the regime was 
reclassified as a managed float, while evidence of intervention aimed at countering the 
long-trend in the exchange rate was used to draw the line between “managed floating” 
and “independently floating” regimes. From 1999, this de facto coding replaced the 
IMF de jure coding in IMF publications. The information is available at a monthly 
frequency beginning in 1990. 
                                                 
8 The authors extended the IMF’s de jure classification backward to 1960 (from 1970). 
9 The purpose of the study by Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2001) was to investigate the determinants of 
alternative regimes, as opposed to assessing their performance. We refer to their results in Section 3.2.   
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   The remaining studies in the mixed de jure-de facto group supplement the 
judgment of researchers with statistical algorithms. Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(BLP, 2003) and Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (GGW, 2002) modified the de jure coding 
based on observed exchange-rate volatility. BLP developed a two-step approach to 
classify 60 regimes over the period 1973-98. The first step involved the classification 
of regimes as pegged if they were so-classified under the de jure coding although 
some regimes not classified as pegs under the de jure coding were classified as pegs 
by BLP if the volatility of their exchange rates (against the US dollar) was less than a 
specified amount. The remaining regimes were placed into either the intermediate or 
flexible categories on the basis of an index of exchange-rate volatility. To control for 
the impact of the use of a domestic nominal anchor (e.g., inflation targeting, monetary 
targeting) under floating and intermediate regimes, the authors used a dummy variable 
to capture potential effects of the nominal anchor arrangement on GDP growth.
10 
GGW created a de facto measure for 150 countries covering the period 1970-99 using 
what they called a “z-score”, based on changes of the nominal exchange rate and the 
variance of those changes.
11 The de facto measure was converted into a discrete three-
way classification (pegged, intermediate, floating) by using the relative frequency 
distribution of the de jure classification. The intersections of the de facto and the de 
jure codings (65 per cent of all observations) formed a “consensus” classification 
while the remaining observations were discarded.  
  Reinhart and Rogoff (RR, 2003, 2004) performed a radical revision of the de 
jure coding. The construction of what the authors called a “natural” classification for 
153 countries over the period 1946-2001 included the following elements. (1) Using 
five-year intervals to assess the degree of flexibility of the longer-term regime, they 
defined a “freely-falling” regime category if (i) the 12-month rate of inflation 
exceeded forty per cent
12, or (ii) the six months following an exchange-rate crisis 
were accompanied by a transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed or 
independently floating regime. (2) They gave separate treatment to countries with 
either official dual or multiple rates or active parallel (black) markets. (3) In cases 
                                                 
10 To control for the effects of the business cycle, variables were measured as five-year averages. In 
cases where a classification changed during the five-year period, the regime was classified as the one 
that prevailed during most of the period.  
11 The “z-score” was defined as the square root of the sum of (1) the square of changes in the exchange 
rate and (2) the variance of those changes. 
12 If the 12-month rate of inflation exceeded forty per cent, but the market rate followed a confirmed, 
preannounced crawl, the preannounced regime took precedence. 
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 where an announced peg was to an undisclosed basket of currencies, they conducted 
tests to examine whether the peg was, in fact, against a single dominant currency. (4) 
They computed probabilities that the monthly change in the exchange rate remained 
within a ±1 per cent band over a rolling five-year period. If the probability was eighty 
per cent or higher that the change remained within this band, they classified the 
regime as a de facto peg or  de facto crawling peg over the entire period.
13 (5) The 
approach regarding de facto bands (as well as preannounced bands) followed a similar 
procedure as in step (4). (6) Regimes that were not classified under steps (1)-(5) 
became candidates for managed and freely-floating arrangements. To distinguish 
between the two, the degree of exchange-rate flexibility was gauged using statistical 
tests. For many economies the RR classification extends back to 1946. It consists of 
five categories: peg, limited flexibility, managed flexibility, freely floating, and freely 
falling. In terms of these five categories, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) found that, over 
the period 1970-99, only about half the observations - - where each observation 
corresponded to a given economy’s regime in a particular year - - were classified in 
the same category by both the natural and the de jure classifications. 
An alternative statistical procedure that has been employed in the mixed 
classiciation approach is probit analysis. Studies by Eichengreen and Leblang (EL, 
2003) and Dubas, Lee and Mark (DLM, 2005) used probit-type models in which the 
dependent variable was the de jure regime. The fitted values were used as the de facto 
regime, imposing the assumption the de facto regimes reflect transitory deviations 
from the self-described regimes. Under the EL scheme, the regimes were modelled as 
a vector of economic and political variables and period fixed effects. Annual 
frequencies for a sample of 21 middle-income and high-income countries (covering 
the period 1870-1997) were converted into five-year frequencies to derive the de facto 
coding for pegged and flexible regimes used in growth equations. DLM modelled the 
exchange-rate regime as:  
ijt j it ijt x R ε β + ′ =
*  
where   is the de jure regime,
*
ijt R it x′  is a vector of country characteristics,  ijt ε  is an 
error term,   corresponds to country i,  =time, and   = the exchange-rate regime. i t j
 
                                                 
13 The authors distinguished between pegs and crawling pegs by the existence (or lack thereof) in drift 
in exchange-rate changes. 
  13   
 
 The country characteristics used were the volatilities of the exchange rate and 
reserves. The probabilities of being in each regime generated by the multinomial logit 
model were used to construct six fine and three coarse regime codings for 172 
countries over the period 1971-2002. 
2. Pure de facto approaches. Codings in this group are independent of the 
official classification. The authors of two studies in this group aim to capture the 
effect of intervention on the exchange rate. (i) Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS, 
2005) used cluster analysis
14 to construct a three-way classification of pegs, 
intermediate regimes, and floats for 183 countries; under cluster analysis, once the 
number of classifications is determined ex ante by the researcher, economies are 
placed into groups according to similarity of behaviour. Using the sample period, 
1974-2000, LYS analysed the behaviour of three variables, changes in the nominal 
exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, and the volatility of the ratio of net-
reserves-to-the monetary base.
15 For base currency, LYS used either the legal peg (for 
fixed-rate regimes) or the currency against which the exchange-rate exhibited lowest 
volatility. (ii) A similar approach was used by Poirson (2001), who constructed a 
rigidity index on the basis of the ratio of exchange-volatility to reserves for a sample 
of 93 countries during 1990-98.
16  
Other authors that constructed entirely de facto regimes are Shambaugh 
(2004), De Grauwe and Schnabl (DGS, 2005) and Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré (BQC, 
2006). Shambaugh divided regimes into pegs and non-pegs based on whether 
exchange-rate changes were within pre-specified bands. DGS calculated “z-scores” 
for a (limited) sample of 18 South Eastern European and Central European economies 
over the period 1994-2004, using both the euro and the US dollar as reference 
currencies. Two course classifications were constructed: (1) a two-way coding of 
“relatively-fixed” rates and “relatively-flexible” rates and (2) a three-way coding 
consisting of hard pegs, intermediate regimes, and floating regimes. BQC used 
                                                 
14 Cluster analysis is a technique that identifies groups of observations whereby groups are constructed 
according to similarities among sample elements. 
15 Although the final version of their paper describing their classification was not published until 2005, 
an initial version of their paper appeared in 1999. Thus, their coding was available to, and used by, 
other researchers prior to 2005. LYS (2007) updated their dataset to cover the period 1974-2004, and 
examined the relationship between exchange rate depreciations and growth and productivity in 
developing countries. 
16 Poirson did not use her classification to examine the effects of exchange-rate regimes on economic 
performance. 
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 regression analysis to estimate implicit basket pegs as linear combinations of bilateral 
exchange-rate variations against the U.S. dollar, the yen, and the euro. Their dataset 
included 165 countries and covered the period 1994-2001. Regimes were classified as 
pegged when at least one of the basket coefficients was different from zero. All other 
regimes were classified as floating regimes.
17
3.2 Assessing the Classifications  
  With the development of alternative regime codings a literature that uses the 
classifications to investigate issues other than macroeconomic performance and the 
evolution of regimes is rapidly emerging. One research area that has received 
considerable attention concerns the determinants of the choice of exchange-rate 
regime.
18 Examples in this genre include the following. (1) Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
(2001) applied their four-way coding to a group of 26 Latin American and Caribbean 
economies. They found that the authorities of economies with governments that had 
strong support in the legislature tended to choose pegged regimes while the authorities 
of economies with an important manufacturing sector tended to choose either floating 
or backward-looking crawling pegs. The authors attributed the latter finding to the 
authorities’ view that non-flexible regimes delivered more-competitive exchange rates 
than did pegged regimes.  (2) Poirson (2001) used her three-way coding and the de 
jure coding to determine exchange-rate regime choice for a group of 93 countries. She 
found economic and political factors influenced the three regimes differently and that 
there were significant discrepancies between the determinants of her three codings 
and those of the three-way de jure coding. (3) von Hagen and Zhou (2005a, 2005b) 
studied a group of transition economies over the period 1990-97. Using both the de 
jure and the LYS codings,
19 the authors (2005a) found that official regimes were more 
persistent and changed less frequently  (but in larger steps) than de facto regimes, a 
finding consistent with the view that the cost of changing de jure regimes exceeded 
the costs of changing de facto  regimes. Additionally, applying an eight-way variation 
                                                 
17 Neither Shambaugh (2004) nor BQC used their respective classifications to examine the relationship 
between exchange-rate regimes and economic performance, so we refer to their results here. 
Shambaugh dealt with the issue of monetary autonomy in pegged and non-pegged regimes, finding that 
pegged-rate countries ceded much of their monetary-policy autonomy to the base country; interest rates 
in non-pegged countries were correlated with those in the base country to some extent, but not as much 
as rates in pegged regimes. BQC investigated whether the 1997-98 Asian crisis reduced the percentage 
of intermediate regimes; the authors found a switch from intermediate regimes to hard pegs. 
18 For an overview of recent studies, see von Hagen and Zhou (2007). 
19 Von Hagen and Zhou (2005a) extended the LYS coding to 25 transition economies, from the 20 such 
economies classified by LYS. 
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 of the de jure coding, the authors (2005b) found that many of the factors identified in 
the optimum-currency-area literature, including the geographic concentration of trade, 
product diversification, and openness, were important regime determinants. (4) In a 
further study, von Hagen and Zhou (2007) used both the (three-way) IMF de jure and 
IMF de facto codings to investigate the determinants of regime choice for over 100 
developing economies. The authors found that, in addition to optimum-currency-area 
fundamentals, stabilisation strategies, currency-crises risks, and political and 
institutional variables were determinants of exchange-rate regimes. These findings 
highlight the importance of accounting for simultaneity in the assessment of the 
macroeconomic properties of alternative exchange rate systems.  
Other recent examples of the use of the codings include studies by Masson 
(2001), who used both the GGOW coding and the LYS coding to investigate whether 
a change in the frequency of transitions between regimes has taken place over time; 
Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2004), who used the de jure and LYS codings to 
assess the way that the exchange-rate regime affects monetary-policy autonomy; 
Alesina and Wagner (2006), who used the IMF de facto and RR classifications to 
explore the relationship between institutions and  commitments to exchange-rate 
regimes; Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003), who used their coding to study whether 
pegged regimes are more crisis-prone than other regimes and whether certain types of 
pegged regimes are more crisis-prone than others; Razin and  Rubinstein (2006), who 
used the de jure and the RR codings to investigate the relationship among the 
probability of a crisis, balance-of-payment policy, and growth; Levy Yeyati (2006), 
who used the GGW and LYS classifications to estimate the correlation between the 
exchange-rate regime and financial dollarisation in developing economies, and 
Genberg and Swoboda (2004), who used the de jure and the RR codings to examine 
the information content about policies provided by those two codings. In the light of 
the emerging literature using these codings, the question arises, “How reliable are 
those classifications for analyzing characteristics of exchange-rate regimes?” We now 
turn to an appraisal, focusing on the IMF de facto, Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(BLP), Dubas, Lee and Mark, (DLM), Eichengreen and Leblang (EL), Ghosh, Gulde 
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 and Wolf (GGW), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS), and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(RR) codings.
20
3.3 Data issues 
  With the exception of the EL coding, which used a bivariate probit model to 
regress the de jure regime on a large number of political and economic variables (but 
not measures of  exchange-rate movements or reserves), all coding is based on 
assessments of exchange-rate movements and, in a few cases, on changes in reserves. 
Devisers of coding schemes confront the following data problems.  
  (1) Apart from the problem of choosing a relevant base currency, devisers of 
coding schemes confront the problem that identical shocks may affect two economies 
very differently even if the authorities of both employ the same exchange-rate system 
(Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002, pp. 42-43). Consider the case of two floating-
exchange-rate systems confronted with an identical external shock; economy A is 
small, relatively-open, and has a narrow export base while economy B is large,   
relatively-closed and has a highly-diversified  export sector. The external shock may 
lead to large exchange-rate changes during a particular period in economy A while the 
currency of economy B exhibits small changes in its exchange rate. In this situation, 
economy A may correctly be classified as floating while economy B may incorrectly 
be assigned to an intermediate category or even the fixed category (Ghosh, Gulde and 
Wolf, 2002).  
  (2) The BLP, DLM, GGW, LYS and RR algorithms use measures of 
exchange-rate variances to capture exchange-rate behavior. A high sample volatility 
could, however, be attributable to a one-time large devaluation in a pegged regime. 
Codings that use short frequencies (annual) may be particularly susceptible to this 
problem of classification.  Rogoff and Reinhart (2004) dealt with this issue by using 
(i) a five-year window to classify regimes and (ii) mean absolute deviations as a 
measure of exchange-rate behavior to minimize the impact of outliers. Those devisers 
(e.g., BLP, GGW, RR), who rely exclusively on exchange-rate behavior, essentially 
correlate growth, inflation and growth volatility with regime indeces that are non-
                                                 
20 As will become apparent below, we focus on those classifications for which codings for a common 
set of countries are available over an overlapping time period (i.e., the period 1990-97).  
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 linear transformations of exchange-rate changes.
21 If the regime can be characterized 
solely on the basis of exchange-rate behavior, the following question arises: why not 
use the exchange rate, instead of a transformation of the exchange rate, as the control 
variable? Devisers of codings based solely on exchange-rate movements have not 
addressed this issue. 
  (3) A few codings (DLM, IMF de facto, LYS) use information on reserves. 
Clearly, changes in reserves can be a key indicator of foreign-exchange-market 
intervention. Nevertheless, data on reserves can be highly unreliable. As Bubula and 
Ötker-Robe (2002, pp. 10-11) pointed-out, these data can be distorted by valuation 
changes and by official borrowings or repayments. Moreover, official data, even if 
they are not distorted by those factors, make no allowance for the fact that 
intervention by the authorities of other countries may negate the need of intervention 
by the country concerned. In some economies, foreign-exchange intervention is 
conducted through purchases and sales of domestic foreign-currency-linked debt. In 
other economies, intervention is carried-out in the forward market. In cases where the 
intervention is conducted through debt denominated in local currency but indexed to 
foreign currency and/or is conducted in the forward market, the extent of the 
intervention may not be reflected in official-reserve data (Rogoff et al. 2004, p. 27). 
  (4) Movements in interest rates (as well as other, less-conventional types of 
intervention) are the dog-that-didn’t-bark variable of de facto codings based on 
statistical algorithms.  The primary reason that algorithms leave out the interest rate is 
the unavailability of official interest-rate series for many economies over long-time 
periods. Clearly, to the extent that the interest-rate instrument is used to influence the 
exchange-rate, codings that omit this instrument are subject to measurement error in 
the construction of variables purporting to represent alternative exchange-rate-
regimes. 
  (5) The IMF de facto and the RR codings use information in parallel exchange 
markets. To the extent that exchange rates in such markets are determined by supply 
and demand factors alone, there is no buyer- or seller-of-last-resort to keep the 
exchange rate fixed. It is difficult to support the contention that a pegged regime is a 
feasible option in such a situation. 
                                                 
21 The RR “free-falling” category, however, is based on inflation. The GGOW, DGS and Shambaugh 
codings also rely exclusively on measures of exchange-rate changes. 
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   Role of monetary policy. As noted in Section 2, the key distinctive 
characteristic of a regime is the extent to which it constrains domestic monetary 
policy. This situation presents the following definitional problems. (1) Consider an 
economy the currency of which is pegged to an anchor currency, but which has 
followed a monetary policy inconsistent with that of the monetary authorities 
governing the anchor currency, resulting in an exchange-rate devaluation in a 
particular year. How should the regime of the devalued currency be classified in the 
year during which the devaluation took place? An example is that of the 13 CFA franc 
zone countries, which had a one-time devaluation against the French franc in 1994 - - 
the only realignment since the establishment of the CFA zone in 1948.
22 Most 
devisers classified the regimes of the CFA zone countries as pegged in 1994. Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), however, classified those regimes as intermediate; 
the latter classification is consistent with the (plausible) view that it was inconsistent 
monetary policies that led (at least in part) to the 1994 devaluation of the CFA 
currencies. (2) A distinction should be drawn between those monetary unions, the 
currencies of which are allowed to float - - e.g., the euro area - - and those monetary 
unions that peg their currencies to another currency - - e.g., the CFA franc zone. In the 
case of the former, the monetary policy of the union is not constrained by the 
exchange rate whereas, in the case of the latter, the monetary policy of the union (and 
not just that of a particular country) is constrained. 
  Role of judgment. The IMF de facto and the RR codings involve substantial 
amounts of judgment - - e.g., whether to use the parallel-market rate or the official 
rate. This situation presents the following problems. A situation such as that of the RR 
coding, under which a few devisers are responsible for tracking regimes for 153 
economies over a sample period that begins in 1946, can lead to errors and 
inconsistencies. An example of the former is RR’s coding of Greece. RR date the 
entry of Greece into EMU as January 1, 1999; in fact, the entry date was January 1, 
2001. An example of the latter is given below in the discussion of RR’s coding of 
Italy. In contrast to the foregoing situation, the IMF de facto coding involves the 
judgment of (literally) hundreds of Fund economists. While the monitoring of 
developments by a large group of economists can help guard against 
                                                 
22 The French currency reform of 1968 introduced a new French franc at a rate of one new franc per 
100 old francs. Although the new French franc involved a revaluation of the CFA franc, the value of 
the latter was left unchanged against the old French franc. 
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 misclassifications, it can lead to heterogeneously-generated classifications - - one 
group of country-desk economists may judge evidence of intervention by the 
authorities of country A as excessive (so that the regime is classified as “managed 
floating”), whereas another group may judge the same amount of intervention by the 
authorities of country B as not excessive (so that the regime is classified as 
“independently floating”).  
  Missing observations. Many algorithms result in missing observations, the 
number of which can be substantial. Consider the following examples. (i) The GGW 
coding retains only those observations for which the de facto and the de jure 
classifications are identical. This procedure reduced the sample by about 35 per cent 
during the 1970-99 period. (ii) The LYS coding discards regimes pegged to an 
undisclosed basket. This situation, combined with missing data on reserves and/or 
exchange rates, caused about 33 per cent of the observations in their sample to be 
unclassifiable. (iii) As noted, the RR coding relies on evidence suggesting the 
presence of a significant parallel market. About 30 per cent of de facto free floats 
were not classified under the RR coding because, although evidence indicated that 
such a market existed, the parallel exchange-rate data were not available. We provide 
specific country examples below. 
 Coding  methodologies. The way currency regimes are analyzed and classified 
can affect the results obtained. To illustrate, in what follows, we present correlations 
among three coarse regimes - - hard pegs, intermediates and floats - - for six de facto 
classifications: those of the IMF, BLP, DLM, GGW, LYS, and RR. With the 
exception of the RR classification, devisers of codings provide three-way regime 
arrangements.
23 For the RR classification, we dropped the freely-falling category, 
unique to RR, from consideration. Using their fine 15-way coding, we put the 
categories “no separate legal tender” and “preannounced peg or currency board 
arrangement” into a single hard-peg category. We also put RR’s “managed floating” 
and “freely floating” regimes into a single floating category. RR classified the 
remaining regimes for which they provided codings as intermediates. Because the 
IMF de facto scheme is available only from 1990, the sample covers the period 1990-
                                                 
23 The EL classification was not used because it separates regimes into only two coarse categories. The 
IMF de jure coding was not used because it coincides with the GGW classification for those regimes 
classified by GGW. 
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 99.
24 Using annual data, a total of 190 countries, i.e., all the members of the IMF, 
were considered. For each correlation, two panels were considered: (1) a balanced 
panel, so that if an observation was missing, or not classified, in one classification, it 
was dropped from the other, and (2) and unbalanced panel that put unclassified 
regimes into a separate category.  
  The correlations are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows correlations using 
the balanced panel. The highest correlation, at 0.83, is between those of the IMF de 
facto and the GGW classifications. The correlations between the RR classification and 
the IMF de facto and the GGW codings are 0.75 and 0.72, respectively. The extent of 
correlation between the IMF de facto and the GGW codings probably reflects the fact 
that both are modifications of the de jure classification. All other correlations are very 
low (i.e., below 0.5).  Panel B reports correlations using missing values as a separate 
category. The highest correlation, at 0.79, is again between those of the IMF and the 
GGW codings. All other correlations are below 0.55.  
3.4. Two specific examples 
  We next consider the specific cases of two advanced economies - - Germany 
and Italy during the period 1990-2001, comparing the regime classifications of these 
economies among the IMF de jure, the IMF de facto, BLP, DLM, EL, GGW, LYS 
and RR, codings. Again, we focus on this particular period because the IMF de facto 
coding is available only beginning in 1990.
25 We choose these particular economies 
mainly because (1) as advanced economies, information about their exchange-rate 
policies is likely to be more-readily available than it is for some developing 
economies (therefore, it should be easier to classify their regimes than those of 
developing economies), (2) during the 1990s each participated to varying degrees in  
the European Monetary System’s (EMS’s) exchange-rate mechanism (ERM), and (3) 
at the end of the decade these economies became members of the euro area.
26  
  Several points are worth mentioning. First, the diversity of classifications is 
considerable. The case of Germany illustrates. The de jure and IMF de facto codings 
classify the regime in the intermediate category for each of the years, 1990-98. The 
                                                 
24 As noted, the BLP coding ends in 1997. 
25 The IMF de jure coding is available only through 1999. In cases where regime codings were 
available for the years 2000-01, we use these years as well. 
26 The founding members of the EMS were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  
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 BLP coding does not classify the regime in any year although the devisers of that 
coding do not explain this circumstance. The EL coding classifies the regime as a peg 
for each of the years, 1990-97. The GGW coding places the regime alternatively in 
the intermediate (for two years) and not-classified (for seven years) categories in 
1990-98. The LYS and RR schemes classify the regime as a float throughout the 
period 1990-98. The DLM coding places the regime either in the floating (for two 
years) or intermediate (for 12 years) during the period 1990-2001. Second, algorithms 
sometimes do not pick up any regimes. The BLP scheme does not classify Germany 
in any year during the entire sample period, 1973-98, while the GGW scheme does 
not classify Germany during 1990-95 and in 1998. The GGW scheme does not 
classify Italy during 1990-91 and in 1994. Third, in the case of the GGW 
classification, missing observations may reflect the omission of those regimes that are 
difficult to classify from the data sample. This inference follows from the way that the 
GGW “consensus” classification was constructed - - i.e., as the intersection of a first-
step  de facto coding based on z-scores and the de jure coding, with the aim of 
excluding outliers - - i.e., those de jure  regimes that did not conform to policy 
announcements. Fourth, the RR freely-falling regime, while primarily aimed at 
isolating economies undergoing very-high inflation rates, can produce odd results.
27 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, two criteria were used to place regimes in the freely-
falling category: (i) a 12-month rate of inflation exceeding 40 per cent, or (ii) a 
transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed or independently floating 
regime during the six months following an exchange-rate crisis. This definition led 
RR to code Italy’s regime as freely-falling over the period September 1992-March 
1993.
28 The RR scheme assigns the same coding to some of the Asian currency 
regimes in the aftermath of Asian crisis of 1997-98, including those of South Korea 
and Thailand. The assignment of such regimes to the same category as the regimes of 
                                                 
27 In a study of the growth effects of exchange-rate regimes, Harms and Kretschmann (2007) found that 
differences between the LYS and RR codings reflected differences in which high-inflation episodes 
were classified; because such episodes are typically associated with the collapse of a peg and 
accompanied by substantial foreign-exchange intervention, LYS group them as fixers, whereas RR 
leave most of them in the freely-falling category. Harms and Kretschmann (2007) found that exclusion 
of RR’s free-falling countries from the LYS classification brought the results of the two codings more 
in line. A similar conclusion was reached by Aghion et al. (2006). 
28 In September 1992, some ERM currencies came under speculative attack, and the Italian authorities 
took the lira out of the ERM. 
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 economies that underwent episodes of hyperinflation seems to provide a biased 
sample with which to compare performance of regimes.
29  
3.5 German problems  
The case of Germany illustrates two basic problems that researchers face in 
attempting to classify exchange-rate regimes. The first problem concerns the deutsche 
mark’s role as an anchor currency in the ERM during the 1980s and for most of the 
1990s. Within the ERM, the mark operated in a fashion similar to that of the U.S. 
dollar under Bretton Woods. Also, as was the case with the dollar under Bretton 
Woods, German monetary policy was, to a sifnificant extent, independent in the 
1990s, with the monetary authorities of the other EMS countries tying their policies to 
those of the Bundesbank. In contrast to the case of the dollar in the Bretton Woods 
system, however, during the 1990s the mark floated against other key currencies. 
Therefore, if a particular coding scheme uses the French franc, for example, as the 
relevant base currency for gauging the degree of exchange-rate volatility in Germany, 
it is probable that Germany’s exchange-rate regime will be classified as a peg or an 
intermediate regime. Many devisers of coding schemes rely (somewhat mechanically) 
on the degree of exchange-rate volatility against a particular base currency (or 
currencies) to determine regime classifications. Yet, as we have stressed, the key 
distinctive characteristic of a regime is the extent to which it constrains monetary 
policy. Using the monetary-policy-independence criterion, Germany’s regime would 
probably be classified as a float during 1990s, as under the LYS and RR codings.
30 
Second, coding systems may not pick-up all regime transitions. German reunification 
involved a monetary union between two large (in terms of population), formerly-
separate currency areas.
31 While the economy of the former East Germany was 
relatively small, reunification imposed a long-lasting fiscal burden on the former West 
Germany; reunification is widely considered to have been a contributing factor to 
                                                 
29 Indeed, the RR freely-falling category was devised to avoid problems resulting from putting together 
floating regimes with those associated with episodes of hyperinflation. Thus, Rogoff and Reinhart 
(2004, p. 16), argued: “In our view, regimes associated with an utter lack of monetary control and the 
attendant very high inflation should not be automatically lumped under the same exchange rate 
arrangement as low inflation floating regimes. On these grounds, freely falling needs to be treated as a 
separate category…” It is also worth pointing out that, unlike the case of Italy, the United Kingdom’s 
regime is not classified under the RR system as freely-falling as of September 1992, although sterling 
left the ERM under similar circumstances to those of  the lira in that same month.  
30 On the problems that arise with anchor currencies of regional pegs, within the context of the mark’s 
role in the EMS, see von Hagen (1989). 
31 In 1990, the population of the former West Germany was about 60 million and that of the former 
East Germany was about 17 million. 
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 relatively weak economic growth in (the unified) Germany for 15 years. Yet, this 
monetary union, the most significant in the 1990s prior to EMU, is not taken into 
account in any of the coding schemes.  
 
4. Regime performance 
4.1. Analytical considerations and earlier literature 
  In models without nominal rigidities, the exchange rate system does not matter 
for real variables (except for real money balances). This consequence is the direct 
result of the neutrality or super-neutrality properties of such models, even in the short 
run (Stockman, 1999, p. 1485). The situation is very different in the presence of 
nominal frictions (price and/or wage rigidities). In general, nominal frictions 
introduce a non-equivalence across different monetary regimes.  Alternative exchange 
rate systems have different shock absorbing properties and are thus associated with 
differences in macroeconomic volatility and relative prices. In models in which 
certainty equivalence does not hold, alternative systems may even be associated with 
differences in the long term allocation of resources.  
The earlier (i.e., pre-late 1990s) empirical literature on the performance of 
alternative exchange-rate systems focused mainly on comparing unconditional 
variances of nominal and real exchange rates under the Bretton-Woods system and the 
successor (beginning in 1973) system of managed-floating exchange rates. Stockman 
(1983) and Mussa (1986), for example, found that the post-1973 period was 
characterized by increases in the volatility of real exchange rates compared with that 
of the Bretton-Woods era. These findings were corroborated in studies by Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995). The latter two studies also examined 
the volatilities of other macroeconomic variables under the respective regimes. Apart 
from the greater variability of real exchange rates under the managed floating regime, 
Baxter and Stockman found little evidence of systematic differences in the behavior 
of macroeconomic aggregates (consumption and industrial production) under the two 
regimes. A similar result was obtained by Flood and Rose, who found that the 
unconditional volatilities of such macroeconomic variables as industrial production, 
money, consumer prices, and interest rates did not change very much across the two 
regimes. Additionally, in their study, Baxter and Stockman (1989) presaged the 
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 subsequent literature in that they also used the IMF de jure classification to assess the 
performance of three exchange-rate regimes - - pegged, intermediate, and flexible - - 
in the post-Bretton Woods period. Extending the list of macroeconomic variables to 
include trade flows, the authors again found that the behavior (i.e., volatilities, 
correlations) of real aggregates did not appear to change in any systematic way as a 
result of the exchange-rate system while changes in real-exchange-rate variability and 
real trade variability appeared to be independent of each other.  
The finding emerging from the earlier empirical literature that the volatility of 
many  key macroeconomic variables is invariant to the exchange-rate system while 
that of the key relative price --the real exchange rate—is not, creates a major 
conundrum.  Recall that the neoclassical model with flexible prices implies the 
absence of an effect on any real variable. Therefore, it is consistent with the finding 
that the volatility of most macroeconomic variables is independent of the exchange 
rate regime in place, but inconsistent with the finding that the volatility of the real 
exchange rate is not. Models with nominal rigidities, on the other hand, can account 
for the latter result, but are inconsistent with the former finding.  These 
inconsistencies between the empirical evidence and the implications of the main 
theories of exchange rates strongly suggest that the classification of exchange rate 
regimes used in this literature is problematic. Consequently, even before the empirical 
evidence can be utilized by the authorities to select among alternative exchange-rate 
regimes - - and Stockman (1999, p. 1492) commented that, while empirical evidence 
may eventually help, “we remain a long way from having that evidence now”- - 
progress must first be achieved at the classification front. A considerable amount of 
research has been devoted to this issue during the last few years.  
4.2 Empirical methodology 
  Several key differences distinguish the empirical methodology followed by 
authors of the recent literature from the general approach adopted in the pre-late 
1990s literature. First, whereas the earlier literature was based solely on the de jure 
coding, the recent literature investigates the possible relationship between 
macroeconomic aggregates and exchange-rate regimes using the de facto codings 
described above, sometimes in conjunction with results based on the de jure coding. 
Second, earlier studies mainly compared differences in time-series properties between 
the Bretton-Woods pegged-but-adjustable exchange-rate system and the subsequent 
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 managed-floating exchange-rate system while recent studies assess performance of 
the variety of systems that have sprung up in the post-Bretton Woods era.
32 Third, 
whereas authors of earlier studies focused exclusively on comparisons of 
unconditional moments of macroeconomic variables to assess differences in 
behaviour, authors of subsequent studies have also reported conditional first and 
second moments of per-capita growth and inflation derived from panel-data 
regression analysis.  
  Real per-capita growth. A general formulation, which captures  the framework 
used in the exchange-rate regime literature to determine conditional behaviour, 
specifies a country’s per-capita growth rate at time,  , as a function of vectors of  
control variable and initial values of state variables (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, 
pp. 511-520). 
t
it it it itk t i it X V R y ε δ β γ α + + + + + =                     (1) 
where  is the growth rate of real per-capita GDP it y
33 in country i in period  ,  t i α  are 
country-specific (fixed or random) effects,  t γ  are time dummies (as opposed to a time 
trend)
34,    is a vector of state variables measured at the beginning of  period  t,   
is a vector of control variables measured as averages over period  , and  
it V it X
t it ε  is an error 
term. Most authors use annual data, but some use five-year frequencies on the 
supposition that the latter help eliminate business-cycle effects. The country-specific 
(fixed or random) effects,  i α , control for unobserved differences among countries 
while the time dummies  t γ , are intended to capture the effects of global shocks 
common to all countries considered. Exchange-rate regime effects are investigated by 
augmenting equation (1) with a vector of variables,  , that aim to capture the 
regime,   for country i at period t. The exchange-rate regime can be represented 
either through a regime-specific dummy if a statistical algorithm is used or via the 
probability of having a particular regime if a logit or probit model is used.   
itk R
k
                                                 
32 As noted, however, Baxter and Stockman (1989) also investigated differences among three 
alternative de jure systems in the post-Bretton Woods period. Also, Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) 
compared the performance of regimes over the period 1880-1997. 
33 Most authors use the log of per-capita GDP growth. 
34 A time dummy is common across the panel. If the panel includes, for example, observations at 25 
different times, it includes 24 separate time dummies.  
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   To deal with potential simultaneity effects - - e.g., the possibility that a 
country with a history of relatively-low inflation may be more apt than a country with 
a history of relatively-high inflation to adopt pegged rates - - most authors report 
results based on some form of instrumental-variable estimation (e.g., Two-Stage Least 
Squares, 2SLS, dynamic Generalised Method-of-Moments, GMM). The “estimated” 
second-stage exchange-rate regimes, even for de facto codings generated from a 
statistical algorithm, are typically the probabilities derived from a logit or probit 
model.  The basic binomial or multinomial logit model takes the following form. Let 
Yit be a discreet choice variable indicating if country i at time t is in regime 1,2,..n. 
Then, the general multinomial regression is of the form 
     it it t it e X Y + = β      (2) 
The probability of being in regime k at time t for country iis then given by 
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       (3) 
Pitk then become a set of variables which measure the probability of being in each 
regime at each point in time for each country. These variables may then be entered 
into a GMM or 2SLS regression. 
  In selecting the relevant control variables in equation (1), authors seek 
guidance from the empirical growth literature. In doing so,  authors  confront  the 
following problems, which though typically overlooked, nevertheless need to be 
mentioned. First, because there does not appear to be a consensus theoretical 
framework on growth to guide empirical work in the area, a diverse and sometimes 
unwieldy empirical growth literature has been produced, in which over fifty variables 
have been found to be correlated with growth in at least one regression but also in 
which few studies control for the variables analysed by other researchers (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992, p. 943.) This situation has carried over to the exchange-rate-regime 
literature, making it difficult to isolate the effect of the regime on growth from the 
effects of other factors, such as omitted-variable bias when a control variable included 
in one study has been omitted from another. Second, following the work of Kormandi 
and Maguire (1985), a common feature of most cross-country growth regressions, 
including those used in the exchange-rate-regime literature, is that the explanatory 
variables are entered linearly, independently, and are assumed to have coefficients 
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 that are invariant both over time and cross-sectionally. These assumptions can be 
overly-restrictive, biasing the results obtained. For example, the effects of a  particular 
exchange-rate regime on growth during the 1970s, when capital mobility was 
relatively low, may have been quite different from the effect of that regime during the 
1990s, when capital mobility was greater, so that, because of the effect of other 
factors over time, the coefficients for a given regime may be time-variant.
35 Third, in 
an evaluation of the empirical growth literature, Levine and Renelt (1992) found that 
the empirical linkages between long-run growth rates and a broad array of economic-
policy, political, and institutional variables used in  cross-country regressions are not 
robustly-correlated with growth; small alterations on the conditioning set overturn 
previous results.
36  The authors interpreted their findings as suggesting that the results 
of cross-country studies are sensitive to the conditioning information set. 
Consequently, the conditional results below pertaining to the exchange-rate-regime 
literature need to be interpreted in the light of these estimation problems.  
  Growth volatility. To determine the conditional volatility of output, a measure 
of volatility (e.g., the standard deviation of real-GDP growth, the percentage deviation 
of real GDP from a filtered trend) is regressed on a set of variables as in equation (1). 
Typically, the variables selected are a sub-set of the variables used in the growth 
regression.  
  Inflation and inflation volatility.  The basic set-up for regressions of inflation 
and inflation volatility are essentially the same as equation (1), incorporating, in 
addition to the exchange-rate regime, control and state variables, country-specific 
(fixed and/or random) effects, and time dummies. The particular control and state 
variables are chosen to reflect factors considered to influence inflation, such as money 
growth, trade openness, and measures of central-bank independence.   
4.3 The empirical evidence 
  We now summarize the main empirical results (both unconditional and 
conditional).
37 Typically, three coarse regimes - - floats, intermediates, and pegs - - 
                                                 
35 For a formal treatment of these issues see Swamy and Tavlas (2001, 2007). 
36 Levine and Renelt (1992) found that only the share of investment in GDP and the initial level of 
income had a robust, statistically-significant correlation with cross-country growth differentials. They 
also pointed-out that many of the variables used in the conditioning set of growth regressions likely 
contain measurement error. 
37 For growth and inflation, the mean values are discussed. Average values can be skewed by outliers, a 
circumstance that applies especially to the case of inflation (e.g., during hyperinflationary episodes), so 
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 are considered, but in the case of studies that use the Reinhart and Rogoff 
classification, up to five coarse codings - - freely floating, managed floats, limited 
flexibility, pegs, and freely falling - - are considered. Included in what follows are 
studies that compare more-specific regimes (e.g., dollarization, currency boards) with 
other regimes. 
 Growth. The literature does not provide clear-cut support for the hypothesis 
that any particular regime enhances growth. Unconditionally, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002), Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Rogoff et al. 
(2004, using the RR coding) found that intermediate regimes grow faster than other 
regimes. However, Bailliu, Lafrance and Perraut (2003) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003), using their respective codings, found that floating regimes 
registered the highest growth rates, while De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) found that 
pegs grew faster than flexible regimes. A similar, mixed picture applies to the results 
of growth regressions. For example, Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997), De 
Grauwe and Schnabl (2005), and Rogoff et al. (2004) found that differences among 
regimes were mainly small. In contrast, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) found that floating regimes had the highest growth 
rates, whereas Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) found that intermediate regimes were 
associated with higher growth; Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2003), Dubas, Lee and 
Mark (2005) and De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) found that pegged regimes had the 
highest growth rates. 
  Studies comparing unconditional results for more-specific regimes, using the 
de jure coding, do not shed much light on this. Several studies show that currency 
boards recorded high growth rates compared with other pegged regimes and floats 
among all IMF members (Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf, 2000) and with developing 
economies that had their own central banks, regardless of the currency regime pursued 
(Hanke, 2002). However, Edwards (2001), in comparing a group of dollarised 
economies with a control group consisting of all other regimes among both advanced 
and emerging-market economies, found that dollarised regimes recorded much lower 
growth rates. Similar results were obtained by Edwards and Magendzo (2006), who 
compared the performances of 16 dollarised developing economies with those of 132 
                                                                                                                                            
that the median may be a more appropriate measure. While only some studies report median values, all 
report the means. Accordingly, we focus on means here.  
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 non-dollarised  developing economies; These sets of results appear to be conflicting. 
Currency boards and dollarised economies are close relatives in the hard-peg 
category; analytically, the reason that growth performance relative to other regimes 
should diverge so sharply is unclear.
38
  Regression studies comparing more specific regimes using the de jure coding 
also yield mixed results. Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2000) provided evidence indicating 
that currency boards tended to grow faster than other pegged regimes and floats; 
however, the regime dummy for the currency board was statistically significant in 
only in two of four regressions. Edwards and Magendzo (2003) compared the 
performance of (1) own-currency regimes, (2) dollarised economies, and (3) 
economies that were part of a common-currency area in which the common-currency 
was not issued by any of the members.
39 The authors found that the growth 
differential between the first two groups was not statistically significant. They also 
showed that economies that were part of a common-currency area grew much faster 
than own-currency economies. Edwards and Magendzo (2003) noted that many 
members of common-currency areas tend to have very-small, open (e.g., island) 
economies. Therefore, they inferred that their results concerning the growth 
performance of such areas cannot be generalised to other regions. In a further study 
comparing dollarised with non-dollarised developing economies, using the IMF de 
jure coding, Edwards and Magendzo (2006) found that the dollarisation effect  on 
yearly GDP growth was slightly negative on average, but not statistically significant.
40  
  Despite the wide disparity of results, several common threads among the 
regression studies can be discerned. First, in studying the connection between the 
exchange-rate system and growth, it appears that the level of country aggregation 
matters. Studies that disaggregated countries into subgroups of advanced and 
developing economies often found that, for the former group, the exchange-rate 
                                                 
38 Part of the explanation may be attributable to the fact that Hanke’s (2002) sample, which begins in 
1950 and ends in 1993, contains many observations that do not overlap with those in the sample used 
by Edwards (2001), which covers the period 1970-97, and the sample used by Edwards and Magendzo 
(2006), which runs from 1970-98. This circumstance does not explain the differences between the 
results of Edwards (2001) and Edwards and Magendzo (2006), and those of Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf 
(2000), who used similar time periods (1970-97, 1970-98 and 1975-96, respectively). Most studies 
assessed the performance of currency boards using data samples that ended prior to the collapse of 
Argentina’s currency board in December 2001. 
39 An example of a common-currency area cited by the authors is the Central African Franc Zone. 
40 Consistent with these results, Edwards (2006) found that developing economies with currency unions 
experienced larger negative impacts on GDP growth from external shocks.  
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 system either made little difference or that floats registered higher growth rates than 
other regimes, whereas, for the latter group, pegs were associated with higher growth 
(Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002; Rogoff et al., 2004; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005; 
Dubas, Lee and Mark, 2005).
41 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), however, found 
that, while growth rates were significantly higher under floats than pegs for all 
countries in their sample, the negative impact of pegs on growth was entirely 
accounted for by their group of non-industrial economies; for industrial economies, 
the exchange-rate regime was found to be largely irrelevant.
42 Second, the presence of 
a strong monetary-policy framework, rather than the exchange-rate system per se, 
appears to be an important determinant of growth. Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(2003) provided direct evidence in support of this view. They regrouped regimes into 
three categories of (1) pegged, (2) more flexible (including both intermediate and 
flexible regimes) with a nominal anchor, and (3) more flexible without a nominal 
anchor. Their results indicated that the “more flexible with-an-anchor regime” and the 
pegged regime - - which, as the authors noted, contains a built-in anchor (the peg) - - 
were associated positively with growth, compared with the “more flexible without-a-
nominal-anchor regime”. This view is also consistent with Rogoff et al.’s (2004) 
interpretation of their result regarding the statistical association between pegged 
regimes and growth; the authors inferred that developing economies, which 
sometimes lack sound institutions and a strong anti-inflation track record, may have 
gained credibility and enhanced policy discipline (thereby, lowering interest rates) by 
adopting pegged rates.  
  Third, the evidence indicates that country-specific factors matter. Analysing an 
array of regressions, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002, p. 106) concluded that their 
finding of higher growth for economies with intermediate and pegged regimes was 
attributable not so much to that regime per se, but to variables such as size, openness, 
and terms-of-trade growth, and the existence of simultaneity bias. Correspondingly, 
Edwards and Magendzo (2003) argued that the superior growth performance they 
                                                 
41 Rogoff et al. (2004, p. 32) found that “for developing economies…growth appears to decline with 
increased flexibility, though the effect is not statistically significant”. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002, 
pp. 94-95) distinguished between upper income and lower income country groups. Conditionally, they 
found that pegged regimes were associated with higher growth among lower income countries; for 
upper income countries, the effect of the regime was not statistically significant. 
42 The authors (2003, pp 1178-79) attributed the differences between their finding and the finding under 
the de jure coding that pegs are associated with higher growth for non-industrial economies to the 
tendency of the de jure coding to misclassify regimes.   
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 detected in the group of common-currency economies was driven mainly by the 
inclusion of very-small and highly-open economies within that group. This argument, 
in turn, is consistent with the above interpretation that a strong monetary framework, 
rather than any particular exchange-rate system, is related to growth; small, highly-
open economies are typically the primary beneficiaries of the monetary anchor 
provided by pegged rates. Fourth, the sample period seems to matter. Most studies use 
sample periods beginning around 1970. As noted above, however, Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2003) created a data base extending back to 1880 for 21 countries and found 
that flexible rates were associated with higher growth rates than pegged regimes. 
These authors also found that the relationship between growth and exchange-rate 
regime was driven by the period between the two World Wars; after 1972, there was 
no statistically significant relation between the exchange-rate regime and growth.  
  Inflation. A finding that emerges from much of the literature, applying to both 
unconditional and conditional results, is that pegged exchange-rate systems tend to be 
associated with lower inflation rates. The study by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) is 
representative of the results reported in the literature. Using the de jure coding over 
the period 1970-99 for a group of one hundred fifty (advanced and developing) 
economies, they found that inflation averaged 13.3 per cent under pegs, 22.0 per cent 
under intermediate regimes, and 24.3 per cent under floats. Using their coding, the 
differences were more pronounced: 9.4 per cent under pegs, 30.2 per cent under 
intermediate systems, and 58.8 per cent under floating regimes.  
  Moreover, within the group of pegged currencies, the literature points to the 
following results: (i) regimes that underwent “frequent” adjustments in central parity 
and, for basket pegs, in the composition and/or the weights of the basket, generated 
higher inflation than did “infrequent” adjusters (Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf, 1997; 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001),
43 (ii) single-currency pegs, which tend  to be 
easier to verify than other pegs, had lower inflation rates than other-pegged 
arrangements (Bleaney and Fielding, 2002), and  (iii) the harder the peg, the lower the 
inflation rate (Edwards, 2001; Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2000; Hanke, 2002; Edwards 
and Magendzo, 2003; Bleaney and Francisco, 2005; Alfero, 2005). 
                                                 
43 Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997) defined “frequent adjusters” as those regimes that changed 
either the central parity, or, for basket pegs, the composition of the basket and/or the weights, more 
than once a year. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) found that, for non-industrial economies, 
“long” pegs (lasting more than five years) and hard pegs provided lower inflation than “short” pegs 
(under five years). 
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   The foregoing discussion nevertheless warrants several comments. First, as is 
the case with per capita growth, the results appear to be sensitive to the grouping of 
economies. When Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) sub-divided their sample into three 
groups - - upper-income, upper-middle income, and lower and lower-middle income - 
- they found that the association of pegged regimes with the lowest inflation outcomes 
applied to only the latter two groups. For upper-income economies, floating regimes 
produced the lowest inflation, followed (in order) by intermediate systems and pegged 
systems; these results held for both the de jure coding and the authors’ coding, and for 
conditional and unconditional estimates. Regressions by Rogoff et al. (2004), using 
the RR coding, support these findings. Separating economies into three groups - - 
developing, emerging markets, and advanced - - Rogoff et al. found that inflation rose 
with increased exchange-rate flexibility in developing economies. The authors also 
found that inflation performance in emerging markets did not exhibit a significant 
relationship with the degree of exchange-rate flexibility. For advanced economies, 
their evidence indicates that inflation declined with increased exchange-rate 
flexibility. The authors attributed this latter finding to the existence of strong 
institutions, including an independent central bank with a clear anti-inflation mandate, 
in such economies; they argued that as economies and their institutions mature, the 
value of exchange-rate flexibility appears to rise. Second, results showing that pegged 
systems are associated with lower inflation than other systems are sensitive to the fact 
that many high-inflation economies tend to have floating rates because of the need for 
frequent adjustments of exchange rates. Correspondingly, most de facto codings tend 
to place those economies that have pegged systems and high inflation rates in the 
flexible-rate category because of the frequent - - and often large - - changes in parity. 
  Output volatility. Authors of empirical studies have used various standard-
deviation measures to gauge the volatility of output. The literature suggests that 
pegged systems are associated with higher growth volatility. A representative example 
is the study by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003); using their coding they found 
that the standard deviation of growth over a centered five-year rolling period was 4.3 
per cent under pegs, 4.0 per cent under intermediate regimes, and 3.4 per cent under 
floats. Rogoff et al. (2004), using the RR five-way classification, calculated a 
centered three-year moving standard deviation of growth: pegged regimes recorded 
the second-highest volatility (after freely-falling regimes), while freely-floating 
  33   
 
 regimes registered the lowest volatility. Bleaney and Fielding (2002) obtained similar 
results in their study of eighty developing economies using the de jure coding. The 
relationship between output volatility and exchange-rate fixity also applies to the 
studies of dollarised economies by Edwards (2001) and Edwards and Magendzo 
(2006); these authors found that dollarised economies were associated with higher 
growth volatility than other regimes, including other pegged arrangements. In the light 
of these findings, an issue that arises is whether the variation that cannot be reflected 
in relative prices under fixed rates is forced into the real economy. 
  Bipolar hypothesis. Several studies found that a move to the corner regimes of 
floating and hard pegs has taken place. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) applied a six-
way  de jure coding, which permits monetary unions, dollarised economies, and 
currency boards to be placed into a single hard-peg category to a sample of 150 IMF 
member countries over the period 1975-99. They found that the proportion of 
intermediate regimes declined from about 84 per cent in the 1975 to about 50 per cent 
in 1999; the share of pure floats rose from about five per cent to 27 per cent while the 
share of hard pegs rose from about 12 per cent to about 23 per cent.
44 Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005), using an adjusted (see below) variant of their three-way 
coding, obtained broadly similar results; for the group of non-emerging market 
developing economies, however, the move away from the corners was much less 
pronounced.  
  Bubula and Ötker (2002) used the fine (15-way) IMF de facto coding for 190 
IMF members, which also puts dollarised economies, currency boards, and monetary 
unions into a single, hard-peg category to study the bipolar hypothesis; they put 
“independently-floating” and “managed floats with no predetermined exchange-rate 
path” into a single floating-regime category, and all other regimes into an intermediate 
group. They found that the share of intermediate regimes fell from about 70 per cent 
in 1990 to around 40 per cent in 2001;  the shares of hard pegs and floating regimes 
gained 10 percentage points (to 25 per cent) and 20 percentage points (to 35 per cent), 
respectively.
45 The authors also found, however, that the move toward the corner 
regimes was less-pronounced for the group of non-emerging-market developing 
                                                 
44 Intermediate regimes consist of the following categories: single-currency pegs, basket pegs, floats 
with rule-based intervention and floats with discretionary intervention. 
45 See, also, Fischer (2001), who applied the IMF de facto coding, using 185 economies, to the period 
1991-99.  
  34   
 
 economies, which tend to be less-integrated into global capital markets than other 
economies.  
  The vanishing-middle hypothesis did not, however, receive support in the 
studies by Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2003), using the BLP coding, Rogoff et al. 
(2004), using the RR five-way coding, and Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005), using their 
three-way coding. The former authors found that during 1974-98, the share of 
intermediate regimes rose from about 20 per cent to about 45 per cent; the share of 
pegs fell from about 75 per cent to about 40 per cent, and the share of floats rose from 
about five per cent to about 15 per cent. Rogoff et al. found that the share of 
intermediate regimes remained at about one-half between the mid-1970s and 2000. 
Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005) found that, while there was some movement away from 
pegs and toward intermediate regimes in the 1970s, the respective shares of the three 
main regimes was essentially unchanged since the early 1980s. 
  The following issues merit comment with regard to the above investigations. 
First, the six-way de jure coding, used by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002), while   
permitting a  distinction among hard pegs, free floats,  and other regimes, runs into the 
Calvo and Reinhart “fear-of-floating problem”. That is, since the six-way 
classification  used by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf  was the IMF de jure coding, that 
coding may have included as floats those regimes under which the authorities 
intervened frequently to stabilise exchange rates, imparting a bias in favour of finding 
more regimes in the freely-floating category than in the other categories. A similar 
argument applies to those regimes classified as de jure pegs, the currencies of which 
underwent frequent devaluations. Second, differences among studies in definitions of 
regimes can matter for results obtained. To provide an example, Bubula and Ötker-
Robe (2002) - - as well as Fischer (2001), who used the IMF de facto coding - - 
defined the floating-corner regime to include both “independently floating” and 
“managed floating” arrangements. Bubula and Ötker-Robe found that, during their 
1990-2001 sample period, the share of managed floats rose by 8.1 percentage points, 
helping account for their finding in support of the bipolar hypothesis. In contrast, 
when Rogoff et al. (2004) investigated the hypothesis, they put managed floats, along 
with the “limited flexibility” and “other pegs” category, into the intermediate regime 
category. Third, tests of the bipolar hypothesis require that a distinction be made 
between hard pegs and other pegs since the hypothesis concerns a move to the corner 
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 regimes of floating and institutional hard pegs (monetary unions, dollarised 
economies and currency boards). Studies that use coarse codings based on statistical 
algorithms, such as the LYS and BLP codings, may not provide sufficient fineness 
among regime classifications to serve as an adequate basis for testing the bipolar 
view. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger recognized that a potential problem existed with 
the use of their coding to test the bipolar view. Therefore, they used what they termed 
“other sources” (presumably official) to identify hard pegs and to place other 
(conventional) pegs in the intermediate-regime category, finding strong support for 
the bipolar view. Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2003) did not make a corresponding 
adjustment to their three-way classification and found strong evidence against the 
bipolar hypothesis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Most economists recognize that we lack a generally-accepted and well-
corroborated theory of exchange-rate determination. This circumstance carries over to 
the absence of a generally-accepted theory of the real and nominal effects of 
exchange-rate systems. In the presence of genuine scientific uncertainty concerning 
exchange-rate determination, it is often difficult to interpret whether movements in 
real exchange rates reflect changes in underlying fundamentals or non-fundamental 
noise. Presumably, the productive and allocative consequences of the former 
movements would be quite different from those of the latter.  
  Devisers of the de facto codings of exchange-rate regimes have sought to 
construct codings that are “optimal” in the sense of capturing the underlying structure 
of a country’s exchange-rate regime, taking account of country characteristics (e.g., 
openness to trade) and the practices of the monetary authorities (as reflected, for 
example, in the bilateral exchange-rate volatility against the currency of a  major 
trading partner) and, on the basis of  the de facto coding, provide evidence that can 
help discriminate  among the performance of alternative systems. Our review of this 
rapidly-growing literature points to some general, but far from conclusive, empirical 
findings regarding the effects of alternative exchange-rate systems. We briefly 
summarise these findings as follows.  
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 (1)  Unconditionally and conditionally, it is difficult to discern a clear-cut 
relationship between per-capita growth and the exchange-rate regime. Conditionally, 
there is some evidence that for advanced economies the exchange-rate system either 
made little difference for growth or that floats registered higher growth rates than 
other regimes. For developing economies there is some positive association between 
pegs and growth. Those authors who examined the effects of a strong monetary policy 
framework found that such a framework, rather than the presence of a particular 
exchange-rate system per se, appeared to be a determinant of growth. (2) Both 
unconditionally and conditionally, pegged exchange-rate systems tend to be 
associated with lower inflation than other types of regimes, but the results are 
sensitive to the grouping of economies and the fact that many high-inflation 
economies have had floating rates because of the need of frequent  adjustments of 
exchange rates. For upper income or advanced economies, floating regimes tend to 
produce the lowest inflation. For lower income or developing economies, pegged 
regimes are associated with lower growth. (3) Unconditionally, all studies using de 
facto codings found that pegged regimes were associated with higher output volatility. 
(4) The evidence on the bipolar hypothesis is mixed, with several studies providing 
strong evidence that a generalized move to the corner regimes has taken place while 
several other studies showing that such a movement has not taken place. 
  The major source of uncertainty associated with the above results is that 
relatively little is yet known about the robustness of regime comparisons to a number 
of factors, including, inter alia, sample periods, data frequency, conditioning 
variables, definitions of regimes, empirical methodologies used to classify regimes, 
the level of details in the  regime classification, the kinds of countries included in the  
sample, the influence of shocks on the outcomes, and the treatment of endogeneity. 
The difficulty in making comparisons among codings reflects the lack of knowledge 
of the “true” regime.  Indeed, it is worth recalling that the majority of de facto regimes 
devised so far and applied to large groups of economies are essentially revisions 
and/or modifications of the de jure coding (with the LYS coding being an exception). 
In the absence of data on the true regime, devisers of codings have produced sets of 
estimates of an unobservable variable, creating the problem of discriminating among 
the codings.  
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   Returning to Stockman’s (1999) assessment about what was known about the 
effects of the exchange-rate regime circa the late-1990s, we believe that we remain a 
long way from having reliable empirical evidence that can help us choose among 
alternative systems. Nevertheless, devisers of de facto codings have made a 
meaningful contribution toward distinguishing between the exchange-rate regimes 
that are officially pronounced and those that are actually practiced. In our view, the 
as-yet unfulfilled objective of this literature, and the major research agenda for the 
future in this area, lies in the need of a more thorough investigation of the degree of 
monetary-policy independence without relying exclusively on movements in 
exchange rates, an agenda the attainment of which is made especially challenging 
because of the lack of comprehensive and reliable data on reserves and interest rates. 
The extension of the analysis to include a more complete assessment of the degree of 
monetary-policy autonomy would have the potential to provide more-relevant 
information about regime behavior than the empirical results produced thus far. 
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Table 1:  Pair wise Correlations Among De facto Coding Schemes, 1990-99 
 
Panel A: Balanced Panel 
 
Coding BLP DLM GGW IMF  LYS  RR 
BLP  1.000          
DLM  0.1886 1.000         
GGW  0.3831 0.3377  1.000       
IMF  0.3378 0.3534 0.8305  1.000     
LYS  0.1736 0.4035 0.4154 0.4781  1.000   
RR  0.3491 0.2796 0.7203 0.7542 0.4828 1.000 
Panel B: Missing values included as a separate category 
Coding BLP DLM GGW IMF  LYS  RR 
BLP  1.000          
DLM  0.5098 1.000         
GGW  0.4085 0.5151  1.000       
IMF  0.3521 0.4564 0.7930  1.000     
LYS  0.4191 0.5211 0.5358 0.5455  1.000   
RR  0.4758 0.4893 0.4954 0.4292 0.4648 1.000 
 
Note 1: Based on annual data. For the RR coding, those authors’ 15-way classification was converted into a three-
way classification dropping the “freely-falling” category all other three-way codings are from the original sources. 
Since we consider pair wise correlations, the BLP data that end in 1997 do not affect the results. 
 
Abbreviations:  
Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (BLP), Dubas, Lee and Mark, (DLM),, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (GGW), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS), and Reinhart and Rogoff (RR)
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